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PUBLIC SUPPORT AND JUDICIAL CRISES IN LATIN AMERICA 
Gretchen Helmke  
If preceding history shows anything, it is that when judicial decisions wander far from 
what the public will tolerate, bad things happen to the Court and the justices.1 
How do courts establish their power?  What conditions undermine 
it?  These are the core questions taken up in Barry Friedman’s recent 
book, The Will of the People.  As his title and the quote above suggest, 
the answer hinges on how aligned judges are with public opinion.  
Drawing on the history of the United States Supreme Court, Fried-
man argues that judicial power waxes when judges are able to discern 
and willing to match the larger trends in the public mood, and wanes 
otherwise.  To the extent that courts are able to build a supportive 
constituency, they will be able to deflect potential challenges to their 
power. 
Here, I begin to explore how well Friedman’s thesis travels to a 
part of the world where courts are widely considered to be weak and 
unstable:  contemporary Latin America.  Although we lack readily 
available data on how specific judicial decisions map onto public opi-
nion, the Latinobarómetro gives us some sense of how public support 
for courts in the region has varied over time and across countries.2  
Paired with a unique, cross-sectional, time series data set on political 
attacks against high courts in the region, which I constructed, I find 
that low public support for the judiciary is correlated with political at-
tacks against judges.  Indeed, low levels of legitimacy appear to have 
more explanatory power than several other intuitively plausible caus-
es of judicial instability.  I then address more general questions of 
 
  Paper prepared for the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 2010 Sympo-
sium:  The Judiciary and the Popular Will (Jan. 29–30, 2010).  I am extremely grateful to 
Shawn Ling Ramirez for outstanding research assistance, to Julio Rios-Figueroa for gene-
rously sharing his data, and to Jeffrey Staton for our many conversations on the themes in 
this paper. 
 1 BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE:  HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE 
SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 375 (2009). 
 2 Latinobarómetro is a public opinion survey conducted annually for several Latin American 
countries by the Latinobarómetro Corporation, based in Santiago, Chile.  The data and 
analysis cited in this section can be found in Gretchen Helmke & Julio Rios-Figueroa, In-
troduction to COURTS IN LATIN AMERICA (Gretchen Helmke & Julio Rios-Figueroa eds.) 
(forthcoming 2010). 
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why support and attacks are linked and why, if public support is so 
central for judicial power, cultivating it often proves elusive. 
A LOOK AT SOME FACTS3 
A. Public Confidence in Courts   
One of the most widely touted facts about the rule of law gap in 
Latin America is how poorly the public regards the judiciary.  Latino-
barómetro surveys provide us with an overview of the evolution of pub-
lic opinion about the judiciary over the last decade and across coun-
tries.  On average, the percentage of Latin American citizens 
reporting that they had “a lot” or “some” confidence in the judiciary 
has hovered in the mid-30% range for most of the period, varying be-
tween a high of 38% in 1995, the first year for which we have data, 
and a low of 20% in 2003.4  Such figures clearly contrast with the 
American public’s image of the United States Supreme Court today.  
Friedman, for instance, cites a recent Gallup poll with 69% of the 
public reporting trust in the judicial branch.5  Moreover, whereas the 
judiciary has emerged as the most trusted branch of government in 
the United States,6 in Latin America the judiciary routinely scores on-
ly slightly higher than the legislature and slightly lower than the ex-
ecutive branch.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 This section draws on Helmke & Rios-Figueroa, id. 
 4 Note that drawing temporal comparisons is complicated by the fact that the number of 
countries included in the Latinobarómetro survey increased over the time period analyzed.  
See id. at 3 (observing that the percentage of people reporting at least “some” confidence 
in the judiciary has spanned between a high of 38% to a low of 20%). 
 5 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 581 n.37 (“[P]ublic trust of the judicial branch remains 
relatively high at 69 percent.”). 
 6 Id. 
 7 Between 1995 and 2000, the average percentage of Latin American citizens reporting 
trust in the legislature was 32%, 36% for the judiciary, and 38% for the executive.  Be-
tween 2000 and 2007, the average amount of trust in the legislature declined to 25%, 
compared to 30% for the judiciary and 36% for the executive branch.  Helmke & Ríos-
Figueroa, supra note 2. 
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Behind the regional averages, however, there is a great deal of 
cross-national variation.8  For example, in Ecuador and Peru, only 
one in five citizens surveyed has any confidence in the judiciary.9  Ar-
gentines, Bolivians, Paraguayans, Guatemalans, Nicaraguans, and 
Mexicans have scarcely better impressions of their courts.10  But in 
Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, and Uruguay, where between 
40% and 50% of people on average have a positive view of the judi-
ciary, the courts appear to be on much more solid ground with the 
public.11 
B. Political Attacks Against Courts   
Throughout the twentieth century, Latin American judiciaries 
have all too frequently been the casualty of regime change, with 
judges resigning en masse whenever dictators displaced democrats 
and vice versa.12  In Argentina, for example, judges were the victims of 
regime instability in 1946, 1955, 1966, 1973, 1976, and 1983.13  In Bo-
livia, political instability under the specter of military rule led to the 
reshuffling of the Supreme Court some seventeen times over four 
and half decades (1936, 1940, 1941, 1944, 1946, 1948, 1952, 1957, 
1961, 1964, 1967, 1972, 1974, 1978, 1979, 1980, and 1982).14  Even 
under Mexico’s relatively stable single-party rule, the Court was sub-
ject to constant manipulation by incoming governments.  Mexico's 
Supreme Court was completely dissolved and re-constituted in 1934, 
 
 8 See infra Figure 2. 
 9 See Helmke & Ríos-Figueroa, supra note 2, at 4 fig.1.2 (showing that only about 20% of 
Ecuadorians and Peruvians approved of courts in their respective countries). 
 10 See id. (estimating that, in the majority of Latin American countries, the courts suffer 
from only 20% to 30% public approval). 
 11 See id. (measuring public approval of the judiciary in Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominican Re-
public, and Uruguay to be over 40%). 
 12 See Joel G. Verner, The Independence of Supreme Courts in Latin America:  A Review of the Litera-
ture, 16 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 463, 469–70 (1984) (explaining that political upheavals have 
led to changes in the court by the dismissal or resignation of judges). 
 13 See Rebecca Bill Chávez et al., A Theory of the Politically Independent Judiciary:  A Comparative 
Study of the United States and Argentina, in COURTS IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 219, 
236 (stating the years in which the Argentine Supreme Court “experienced purges” in re-
sponse to changes in political power); see also GRETCHEN HELMKE, COURTS UNDER 
CONSTRAINTS:  JUDGES, GENERALS, AND PRESIDENTS IN ARGENTINA 62 (2005) (“During the 
cycle of regime instability that plagued Argentina from the 1940s through the 1980s, the 
members of the Supreme Court were replaced with every change in regime.”). 
 14 See Andrea Castagnola & Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, Bolivia:  The Rise (and Fall) of Judicial Review, 
in COURTS IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 3, at 278, 284–85. 
Dec. 2010] PUBLIC SUPPORT AND JUDICIAL CRISES IN LATIN AMERICA 401 
 
1940, and again in 1994 with the latest wave of reforms.15  Despite life 
tenure provisions, the majority of presidents during that time ap-
pointed more than 50% of the justices to the bench.16 
Interestingly, however, in many Latin American countries, the pat-
tern of juridical instability has continued or even increased following 
the advent of democracy.17  In Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador, for 
instance, courts have continued to be targeted for removal or packing 
by nearly every recent democratic government.  From Carlos Me-
nem’s infamous court-packing scheme in 1990, to Lucio Gutierrez’s 
ill-fated attempt to remove all thirty-one judges on the Ecuadorian 
Supreme Court in 2005, to Evo Morales’s nearly constant harassment 
of the Bolivian judiciary since his election in 2006, executives routine-
ly concentrate their energies on attacking sitting judges.  In other 
well-known instances, including Alberto Fujimori’s self-coup in Peru 
in 1992, Jorge Serrano’s unsuccessful effort to stage a self-coup the 
next year in Guatemala, and Hugo Chavez’s attempts to consolidate 
his power through constitutional change in 1999, courts are often 
pulled into larger institutional battles. 
The Institutional Crises in Latin America (ICLA) Dataset18 offers the 
first systematic picture of these types of attacks and threats against 
high courts in contemporary Latin America.  The dataset covers eigh-
teen Latin American countries  (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Co-
lombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gua-
temala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay, Venezuela) from 1985 (or from the year of the country’s 
most recent transition to democracy) through 2008.  Using informa-
tion from the Latin American Weekly Report, I employ the following 
three operational rules for identifying attacks against courts:  1) the 
executive or legislative branch takes actions that threaten the survival 
of justices on the supreme and/or constitutional court; 2) these 
threats affect the majority composition of the court (e.g., court pack-
 
 15 See Beatriz Magaloni, Authoritarianism, Democracy and the Supreme Court:  Horizontal Exchange 
and the Rule of Law in Mexico, in DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY IN LATIN AMERICA 266, 288 
(Scott Mainwaring & Christopher Welna eds., 2003). 
 16 See id. at 287–88 (recognizing that since 1934, “[t]he overwhelming majority of presidents 
appointed more than 50 percent of justices during their terms.”). 
 17 See Aníbal Pérez-Liñán & Andrea Castagnola, Presidential Control of High Courts in Latin 
America:  A Long-Term View (1904–2006), 2 J. POL. LATIN AM. 87, 106 (2009) (“[T]he ad-
vent of democracy may have accelerated the race to control courts, rather than reducing 
it.”). 
 18 GRETCHEN HELMKE, INSTITUTIONS ON THE EDGE:  INTER-BRANCH CRISES IN LATIN AMERICA 
(forthcoming 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author and the University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law). 
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ing, multiple impeachments, forced resignations); and 3) the attacks 
are politically motivated (i.e., they are tied to a specific decision af-
fecting public policy handed down by the court, or they are part of 
broader political battle for judicial control fought between the two 
branches).  Note that setting a relatively high threshold for identify-
ing political attacks against the judiciary helps avoid statistical, Type I 
errors in which, say, the other branches of government legitimately 
seek to punish an errant judge, but thereby potentially excludes some 
important cases as well.19 
FIGURE 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of attacks against Latin American 
high courts by country, combined with the previous data on public 
support.  Roughly consistent with Friedman’s thesis, note that coun-
tries with the highest frequency of crises are also those that tend to 
suffer from the lowest public approval ratings:  Ecuador, Argentina, 
 
 19 For instance, by these coding rules, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s court-packing 
scheme would be coded as a politically motivated attack, but the attempt to impeach Jus-
tice Samuel Chase, which was also politically motivated, would not make the cut by Rule 
2.  Cf. JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, PACKING THE COURT:  THE RISE OF JUDICIAL POWER AND 
THE COMING CRISIS OF THE SUPREME COURT 33–34 (2009) (describing the Republicans’ 
unsuccessful attempt to impeach Justice Chase after he severely criticized the govern-
ment). 
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Bolivia, and Paraguay.  Likewise, judiciaries with the highest public 
approval ratings have had the fewest attacks (Costa Rica, Colombia, 
Brazil, El Salvador, Panama, Uruguay, and Dominican Republic).  
Chile and Venezuela are the only two countries that do not fit the 
apparent pattern.  In the case of Chile, however, it is worth noting 
that most of the threats did not come to fruition.  The fact that the 
incidence of attacks throughout the region has tended to increase in 
the last two decades, while public support has generally decreased, is 
also roughly in line with the central thesis.  Of course, from these de-
scriptive data we cannot tell the direction of the causal arrow—it may 
be that attacks are lowering public support for the courts, not vice 
versa.  Nor can we control for the influence of other plausible expla-
nations for juridical instability. 
To begin to address these questions, I estimate a series of logit re-
gression models in which the dependent variable is whether or not a 
judicial crisis occurs and the unit of analysis is administration year.  
Judicial crises occur in roughly 5% of the observations.20  Through-
out, I use a lagged measure of public support of the judiciary to partly 
ameliorate the problem of endogeneity.  Models 1–10 (shown in Ta-
ble 1 below) allow us to compare the impact of public approval for 
courts to a host of other possible causal factors of judicial crises.21  
Drawing on the existing literature, these alternative factors include: 
 
(1) Political Fragmentation.  Standard separation of powers theo-
ries contend that the level of political fragmentation im-
pedes the political branches’ capacity to punish courts.22  
Here, I capture this relationship using information on Latin 
American Presidents’ seat shares in the lower house with a 
dummy variable coded 1 for presidents that lack a congres-
 
 20 There is no clear threshold for what constitutes a rare event; thus, all of these models are 
estimated both with and without the rare events software, ReLogit, available from Gary 
King.  The ReLogit results are presented below, but the method has no material impact 
on the results.  In addition, each model is run with the data clustered by country. 
 21 Because the Latinobarómetro data begin in 1995 (and skip 1999), I use Amelia software 
available on Gary King’s website to impute the missing observations for 1985–1994 and 
1999.  I report below results based on the imputed data; however, the substantive results 
do not change materially if I restrict the analysis to the existing data and run the analyses 
only on the years 1995–1998 and 2000–2008. 
 22 Note, of course, that according to the theory such attacks should simply remain off the 
equilibrium path.  Cf. Gretchen Helmke & Jeffrey K. Staton, The Puzzling Judicial Politics of 
Latin America:  A Theory of Litigation, Judicial Decisions, and Interbranch Conflict, in COURTS IN 
LATIN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 306, 312–13 (“[M]ost strategic models of interbranch re-
lations tell us that such attacks should remain strictly off the equilibrium path.”). 
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sional majority, and 0 for presidents that have majority con-
trol over congress. 
 
(2) Constitutional Protections.  Although scholars of Latin Ameri-
can politics routinely fret that institutions are mere “parch-
ment barriers,” dating back to Hamilton, constitutional 
theorists and judicial scholars alike assume that constitution-
al guarantees reduce the pressures judges face.  To assess 
whether de jure institutional protections serve to or fail to 
insulate Latin American judges, I use an aggregate measure 
from an extensive new data set on Latin American constitu-
tions constructed by Ríos-Figueroa.23  The variable, Insula-
tion, ranges from 0–4 and is based on whether two or more 
institutional actors are required to nominate constitutional 
judges, supermajorities are required to initiate impeach-
ment, the number of judges is specified in the constitution, 
and judicial tenure is longer than that of their appointers. 
 
(3) Judicial Power.  Scholars have persuasively argued that judicial 
independence without judicial power is meaningless.24  At 
the same time, however, it may be that increasing judicial 
powers perversely increases the incentives for politicians to 
attack courts.  To assess this possibility, I draw again on Ríos-
Figueroa’s data, constructing an aggregate measure, Judicial 
Power, that captures the number of legal instruments for 
judicial review that constitutional judges can employ.25 
 
 
 23 See Julio Ríos-Figueroa, Institutions for Constitutional Justice in Latin America, in COURTS IN 
LATIN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 27, 36 (comparing the relative insulation of Latin Ameri-
can judges). 
 24 See, e.g., José J. Toharia, Judicial Independence in an Authoritarian Regime:  The Case of Con-
temporary Spain, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 475 (1975) (describing how Spain’s ordinary court sys-
tem was independent but the presence of special courts compromised the power of the 
ordinary judiciary); see also Christopher M. Larkins, Judicial Independence and Democratiza-
tion:  A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 605 (1996) (noting the im-
portance of both independence and power for judiciaries in emerging democracies). 
 25 See Ríos-Figueroa, supra note 23, at 40–50, for a description of the characteristics and 
effects of each of the models of constitutional adjudication used by Latin American de-
mocracies.  For a detailed description of the variety of legal instruments available to Latin 
American judges, see generally Patricio Navia & Julio Ríos-Figueroa, The Constitutional Ad-
judication Mosaic of Latin America, 38 COMP. POL. STUD. 189 (2005). 
Dec. 2010] PUBLIC SUPPORT AND JUDICIAL CRISES IN LATIN AMERICA 405 
 
4)  Level of Economic Development.  In general, juridical stability 
promotes economic development.26  However, per moderni-
zation theory, economic development may also reduce insti-
tutional instability of all types, including attacks against 
courts.  A recent study of tenure and turnover on Latin 
America’s high courts, for instance, finds modest support for 
this claim.27  To examine this, I use a logged measure of 
GDP. 
TABLE 1 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Legitimacy -.017***     
(lagged) (.006)     
      
Fragmentation  .150    
  (.339)    
      
Institutional    .031   
Protections   (.146)   
      
Judicial     .056  
Powers    (.258)  
      
GDP     -.000 
     (.000) 
      
Constant -3.508*** 
(.552) 
-2.445*** 
(.315) 
-2.448*** 
(.531) 
-2.473*** 
(.637) 
-2.323*** 
(.180) 
n = 472           
 
 
 
 
 
 26 See Robert J. Barro, Determinants of Economic Growth:  A Cross-Country Empirical Study 32–38 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5698, 1996) (explaining that de-
mocracy fosters economic growth). 
 27 See Pérez-Liñán & Castagnola, supra note 17, at 98 (asserting that modernization increases 
institutional stability and reduces judicial turnover). 
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Variables Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Legitimacy -.017***  -.017***  -.017***  -.017***  -.017***  
(lagged) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) 
      
Fragmentation .051    -.002  
 (.416)    (.136) 
      
Institutional   .003   .065  
Protections  (.130)   (.274) 
      
Judicial    .050  .077  
Powers   (.247)  (.420) 
      
GDP    .000 .000  
    (.000) (.000) 
      
Constant -3.537*** 
(.653) 
-3.519*** 
(.671) 
-3.622*** 
(.648) 
-.349*** 
(.584) 
-3.668*** 
(.753) 
n = 472           
 
Note: Statistically significant parameter estimates are denoted by *(p .10),  
**(p ..05), and  *** (p ..001). 
TABLE 2 
Model Explanatory  Variables 
Substantive 
Effects             
(min - max)
Percent 
Correctly 
Predicted
Number 
of Crises  
Predicted 
1 
Legitimacy 
(lagged) 
2% - 29% 57% 27 
2 Fragmentation 8% - 9% 42% 26 
3 
Institutional  
Protections 
8% - 9% 11% 41 
4 Judicial Powers 8% - 10% 11% 41 
5 GDP 5% - 9% 15% 39 
6 
Legitimacy 
(lagged) + Frag-
mentation 
2% - 28% 56% 28 
7 Legitimacy 2% - 28% 57% 27 
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(lagged) + Institu-
tional  
Protections 
8 
Legitimacy 
(lagged) + Judicial 
Powers 
2% - 27% 58% 29 
9 
Legitimacy 
(lagged) + GDP
2% - 25%  56% 27 
10 
Legitimacy 
(lagged) + Frag-
mentation +  
Institutional  
Protections + Judi-
cial Powers + GDP
2% - 32% 57% 29 
 
 
Table 1 provides the coefficients and standard errors for each of 
the regression models, and Table 2 reveals their substantive effects 
and tells us how well each of the models does in terms of correctly 
predicting the data.  Three findings stand out in particular.  First and 
foremost, the lagged measure of public support for the judiciary is 
consistently negative and statistically significant.  Decreasing legiti-
macy from the maximum to the minimum increases the chances of a 
political attack on the courts from 2% to 29%.  By itself, the level of 
public support correctly predicts the data about 57% of the time.  
Second, none of the other factors ever achieve statistical significance, 
nor do they have an even remotely meaningful substantive effect on 
the probability of institutional instability occurring.28  Note that the 
relatively high percentage of correctly predicted cases for the Frag-
mentation variable stems almost entirely from the number of non-
crises that are correctly predicted.  Not surprisingly, adding all of the 
causal factors together in a single model does not improve our pre-
dictive capacity over simply knowing the level of public support.  
Third, however, combining the fact that we are only able to correctly 
predict a little over half of the cases with the observation that the 
constant terms in the regression models are consistently significant 
suggests that there is a good deal of the picture that we are still miss-
 
 28 For the institutional variables, this may be due to the aggregation of the measures used 
here.  Thus, before concluding that formal institutions do not matter, future work 
should, at a minimum, include separately each of the various institutional measures. 
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ing.  Legitimacy may be important for the courts’ stability, but it is 
only part of the story. 
DISCUSSION 
I now conclude by turning to some of the broader questions that 
the foregoing exercise raises in light of Friedman’s thesis.  The first is 
this:  to the extent that public support and judicial attacks are inverse-
ly related beyond our borders, we want to know more about why this 
is so.  The implicit mechanism there, as here, seems to be that the 
public will somehow punish politicians that transgress against courts.  
But is this entirely convincing?  One criticism leveled against previous 
work in this vein is simply that elections, which are the main devices 
for enacting such punishments, are blunt instruments.  Voters care 
about a lot of different issues.  Particularly in contexts like Latin 
America, it hardly seems reasonable to imagine that how courts are 
treated outstrips the economy or crime. 
Conversely, it may be that legitimacy is not always necessary for 
punishment to occur in the wake of an attack.  Here, the case of Ec-
uador is extremely interesting.  As we have glimpsed, Ecuador is both 
a country that has suffered multiple judicial attacks over the last two 
decades and one in which public support for the courts is abysmally 
low.  In 2005, the number of people expressing any degree of confi-
dence in the judiciary was just around 16%.29  Nevertheless, when 
then-President Lucio Gutierrez decided to cut a deal with the opposi-
tion and pack the court with political appointees, the people came 
out on the street in droves to protest.  Eventually, Gutierrez himself 
was forced to resign.  Certainly, in this example, there was no diffuse 
public support for the judiciary to dissuade a potential attack, but 
when the attack occurred, people responded in just the way they 
might in a context where the court enjoys high legitimacy. 
The other broader issue revolves around understanding why, if 
public support is so important for judges to cultivate, it often proves 
so elusive.  Here, a number of possible explanations suggest them-
selves.  One obvious observation is simply that not enough time has 
passed since the third wave of democratic transitions began for Latin 
American courts to establish their role.  After all, one of the key les-
sons of Friedman’s book is that it took several generations for the 
U.S. Supreme Court to iterate toward an equilibrium in which politi-
cal attacks remain entirely off the path.  In Friedman’s words,  
 
 29 Analysis based on data available from Latinobarómetro, various years.  See supra note 2. 
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it has taken the Court and the public some time to learn how their rela-
tionship might work; now that it is understood, violent upheaval is no 
longer necessary. . . . It took the Court quite a while to understand the 
limitations that motivated public opinion imposed on its freedom of 
movement.  By the same token, it took the public several iterations to as-
sess how it felt about disciplining the court, and in what ways.30 
Perhaps the problem in Latin America then is simply that too little 
time has passed since democracy has been successfully established.  
But just as critics of the “democratic consolidation” thesis in Latin 
America and elsewhere have long pointed out, we should not simply 
assume an inherent teleology to institution building.  History carries 
many different possible lessons, and sometimes the legacy of institu-
tional instability is more instability.  It is worth remembering that to 
justify his decision to pack the Argentine Supreme Court in 1990, it 
was enough for Carlos Menem to quip, “Why should I be the only 
president in Argentine history not to have my own court?”31  Moreo-
ver, to the extent that attacks against courts further lowers public 
confidence, it seems just as plausible that a history of previous attacks 
instead triggers a cycle of institutional instability that is exceptionally 
hard to break. 
Yet another possible factor at work is how aware (or unaware) Lat-
in American publics are of their national courts.  Recalling Gibson, 
Caldeira and Baird’s claim that “to know courts is to love them,”32 
perhaps a lack of familiarity is the core underlying problem.  Of 
course, mere awareness may not necessarily bolster support.  As Gib-
son and Caldeira put it, “we are not necessarily arguing that informa-
tion per se leads to heightened institutional loyalty.  Rather, the cir-
cumstances leading to information also contribute to legitimacy.”33 
Latin American courts are arguably in the headlines much more 
frequently than their U.S. counterparts, but the content of the mes-
sage that the public is getting about these courts matters deeply.  As 
Jeffrey Staton’s work on the Mexican Supreme Court clearly demon-
strates, Latin American judges are indeed aware of the importance of 
 
 30 FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 376. 
 31 GRETCHEN HELMKE, supra note 13, at 1. 
 32 James L. Gibson et al., On the Legitimacy of National High Courts, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 343, 
344 (1998). 
 33 James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Knowing the Supreme Court?  A Reconsideration of 
Public Ignorance of the High Court, 71 J. POLS. 429, 437 (2009).  Note that Gibson and Cal-
deira explicitly conceptualize diffuse support or institutional legitimacy as the public’s 
unwillingness to tolerate political attacks or to make fundamental structural changes.  
Legitimacy is then hypothesized as a function of 1) broader support for democratic insti-
tutions, 2) knowledge, and 3) controls for education, political efficacy, and partisan and 
ideological identifications.  Id. at 437–38. 
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“going public” and strategically communicate their decisions precise-
ly to build a supportive constituencies, which can potentially shield 
judges from political sanctions.34  More specifically, Staton argues that 
judges aim to endogenously build their support by engaging in prin-
cipled or impartial decision making.  But precisely because judges are 
never fully insulated from political attacks, sometimes judges’ deci-
sion making is forced to depart from this ideal.  The result is that 
judges find themselves with an unenviable trade-off:  by behaving 
strategically in the short run they can avoid political backlash, but to 
the extent that the public is aware of what the court is doing, the 
judges’ legitimacy suffers in the long run. 
In a recent paper, Staton and I build on just this sort of a tradeoff 
to derive the conditions under which Latin American judges engage 
in risky or bold decision making and suffer the consequences.35  To 
motivate this exercise, we begin with the simple observation that 
standard separation of powers theories—first developed in the U.S. 
and applied elsewhere—wildly under-predict institutional instability.  
That is, if judges are strategic, such models tell us that politicians 
should have little need to discipline them; conversely, if politicians 
are not able to discipline judges, then judges have little reason to be 
strategic.  Yet, reality is far more complex.  For instance, while there is 
ample evidence to suggest that Latin American judges are often stra-
tegic in precisely the way our standard theories would predict,36 some-
times judges engage in quite risky and bold decisions (e.g., barring 
Fujimori’s bid for a third term, or refusing the prosecute military 
leaders for a coup attempt against Chavez).  Why? 
The upshot of our theory is that judicial institution-building is 
fraught with difficulty.  Especially relevant here, the development of 
public support for courts can have non-intuitive results on inter-
branch conflict.37  Indeed, we show that as the public backlash para-
meter increases up to a certain point, the likelihood of a judicial 
purge actually increases.  This is so because at middling levels of be-
liefs about the likelihood of a public backlash, judges may be suffi-
 
 34 See JEFFREY K. STATON, GOING PUBLIC FROM THE BENCH:  STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION AND 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF JUDICIAL POWER 7 (2010). 
 35 See Helmke & Staton, supra note 22, at 306 (noting that judges often engage in risky and 
bold decision making even when they face politically motivated attacks). 
 36 See, e.g., Chávez et al., supra note 13, at 221–22 (arguing that a judge will choose to assert 
autonomy or uphold the government’s position depending upon the government’s likely 
response to a challenge). 
 37 Cf. GEORG VANBERG, THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN GERMANY 20 (2005) 
(explaining that public backlash may result against policymakers who resist popular judi-
cial rulings). 
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ciently convinced that they are protected, while governments may be 
sufficiently convinced that they can get away with an attack.  At lower 
levels, judges are dissuaded from bold decisions, whereas at higher 
levels, politicians are dissuaded from attacks.  But, consistent with Sta-
ton’s other work, our model also suggests that prudence does not al-
ways necessarily pay off, either.  Again, the critical problem with judi-
cial prudence, or “ducking,” is that it risks constructing inaccurate 
beliefs about judicial preferences, essentially teaching future liti-
gants—not to mention the broader public—that judges are either ex-
tremely partisan or unwilling to defend rights. 
Finally, to the extent that we have learned that public support on-
ly explains part of the picture, we need to have a better sense of the 
full range of factors that explain political attacks on courts.  Else-
where, I have shown that juridical instability often takes place in the 
shadow of other forms of inter-branch instability, namely early presi-
dential removals.38  Simply put, presidents who are themselves poten-
tially at risk often seek to improve their lots either by preemptively at-
tacking the court, or by appeasing the opposition with new judges to 
stave off their own demise.  In either case, the famed cycle of omni-
potence and impotence that often defines presidential politics in Lat-
in America fundamentally shapes the incentives that politicians face 
for re-making courts in their own image. 
Taken together, the value of studying courts comparatively is that 
it reminds us that the experience of institution building in the Unit-
ed States should not be taken for granted.  While certainly there are 
success stories in Latin America, such as Costa Rica and Uruguay or, 
more recently, Brazil and Mexico, many of the other experiences 
emphasized here offer a much more sober view of the limits facing 
judges.  The upshot is that this variation provides rich fodder for 
theorizing about the conditions under which courts achieve a mod-
icum of power and stability. 
 
 
 
 
 38 HELMKE, supra note 18. 
